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This paper is the first to explore the effects of school accountability systems on high-achieving students'
long-term performance. Using exceptional data from a large highly-selective state university, we relate
school accountability pressure in high school to a student's university-level grades and study habits.
We exploit a change in the state's accountability system in 1999 that led to some schools becoming
newlythreatened by accountability pressure and others becoming newly-unthreatened to identify the
effects of accountability pressure. We find that an accountability system based on a low-level test
of basic skills apparently led to generally reduced performance by high-achieving students, while an
accountability system based on a more challenging criterion-referenced exam apparently led to improved
performance in college on mathematics and other technical subjects. Both types of systems are associated
with increased "cramming" by students in college. The results indicate that the nature of an accountability
system can influence its effectiveness.
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Cramming: 
The Effects of School Accountability on College-Bound Students 
 
Introduction 
School accountability – the practice of evaluating schools on the basis of the observed 
performance of students, and rewarding and punishing schools according to these 
evaluations – is ubiquitous in the world today, with nations on every continent 
experimenting with such policies.  In the United States, many states had implemented 
school accountability policies well in advance of the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, and some states’ experiments with accountability are currently in their second 
decade.  The stated purpose behind school accountability plans is to encourage schools to 
more effectively educate students, and especially to ensure that all students are gaining 
ground toward subject-matter proficiency. 
Numerous studies, such as Figlio and Rouse (2006) and Jacob (2005), indicate that low-
performing schools facing accountability pressure have improved their students’ test 
scores, not just on the high-stakes tests but also on tests that are directly comparable to 
schools in other states.  Aggregate studies, such as Carnoy and Loeb (2002) and 
Hanushek and Raymond (2005), find that states that adopted high-stakes school 
accountability plans earlier than others have experienced greater growth in average test 
scores as compared with late-adopting states.  The general conclusion reached by these 
studies is that school accountability has had a moderately large positive effect on average 
student outcomes in lower level schools.
1  This research, however, focuses on the effects 
                                                 
1 Other researchers have studied the incentives embedded within school accountability plans. See, for 
example, Boyd et al. (2002); Cullen and Reback (2002); Deere and Strayer (2001); Figlio (2006); Figlio 
and Getzler, forthcoming; Figlio and Winicki (2005); or Jacob (2005).   2 
of school accountability plans on the standardized test scores of average students or low-
performing students. To date there has been no published research investigating the 
effects of these plans on the other end of the academic distribution – high-performing 
students who would almost surely have attained proficiency in the absence of school 
accountability plans.  Even though these students are not the immediate focus of 
accountability plans, the effect these plans have on these students is vital to the nation 
because it is these students who will become the next generation of scientists and leaders. 
It is not obvious how school accountability should affect these college-bound students.  
There are at least two avenues through which accountability rules and tests can influence 
students.  First, accountability rules can affect students’ study skills and study methods. 
Second, these rules also can change students’ knowledge and what they learn: 
·  If schools pay less attention to higher-performing students, these students might 
learn different study methods, such as cramming for exams instead of practicing 
deliberate and continuous study habits.  In addition, if the rewards and sanctions 
for school accountability plans give schools the incentive to substitute attention 
from more successful students to less successful students, the more successful 
students may learn less or learn differently as a consequence.  However, school 
accountability plans might lead to improved study habits if the accountability 
systems induce schools to concentrate on material throughout the school year.
2 
                                                 
2 We suspect that schools may face different incentives to substitute attention from more successful 
students to less successful students depending on their socio-economic status.  In high socio-economic 
status schools, college-bound students are prevalent and schools are unlikely to shift attention in 
meaningful ways from these students.  But in low socio-economic status schools, college-bound students 
may comprise a sufficiently small fraction of the population that they can receive less attention without 
controversy.  Given that high-achieving students in low-income schools are likely to receive very high   3 
·  If school accountability plans and the tests they employ to evaluate schools are 
challenging and based on rigorous standards, it could be expected that school 
accountability plans would have a positive impact on students’ learning. 
However, if schools adhere strictly to the material most likely to be on the high-
stakes test and the focus becomes more fully on high-stakes tests as ends in 
themselves rather than indicators of subject-matter knowledge, school 
accountability plans could have the effect of dulling student and teacher creativity 
and limiting what students learn. 
 Both of these potential consequences may manifest themselves in student performance in 
college, where study habits and course performance might be improved or diminished 
due to school accountability plans.  So, ultimately the important effect of accountability 
plans on college-bound students is an empirical issue, one which has yet to be addressed.  
This paper starts to fill this void in the literature.  We exploit data from a state that 
changed the basis of its accountability system in 1999.  This change directly influenced a 
large number of schools that immediately either transitioned from being threatened with 
sanctions to not being threatened at all, or vice versa.  Using this identification strategy, 
we can measure the impact on students of the school they attend either becoming 
threatened or becoming less threatened.  Because the bases of these two accountability 
systems were so different, we can employ a variety of falsification tests to distinguish the 
effects of school accountability sanctions from the effects of the variables underlying 
these sanctions.  We compare students in the high school classes of 2000 and 2001 – the 
                                                                                                                                                 
grades anyway, a reduction of attention might not provoke substantial parental awareness and protest in 
these schools.   4 
last high school class affected directly by the old accountability regime (because the 
high-stakes test grade is the tenth grade) and the first high school class affected directly 
by the new accountability regime.  Because of the possibility for spillovers – even though 
ninth grade is not a high-stakes grade, for instance, schools may have begun gearing up 
for the tenth grade test, and curricula and teaching styles might not immediately change 
even when accountability pressures change – this empirical approach represents a strong 
test of the effects of accountability sanction threats on student university performance. 
In order to implement this identification strategy, we utilize a remarkable dataset from a 
large selective public university in the state in question.  (The identity of the university 
and the state in question are suppressed to preserve the anonymity of the institution that 
provided us with the data.)  The university in question provided us with data that allow us 
to investigate the impact of attending a high school threatened with accountability 
sanctions on student study habits.  For six large classes in which the university’s students 
watch lectures online rather than in a traditional classroom setting, for the Spring 2003 
semester the university provided us with the precise timing of when students first 
downloaded each lecture.
3  We can therefore measure the degree to which students 
“cram” for exams – delaying studying for a course until the time prior to the test, rather 
than keeping up with the course throughout the semester – and relate this cramming 
behavior to the threat of accountability sanctions faced by the student’s high school 
during the student’s tenth grade.  While our measure of cramming is only one measure of 
student study habits, it has the advantage that it is directly observed and measured, 
                                                 
3  During the semester in question, the download dates were collected by the university in the normal 
course of events.  The students were unaware that these data were being collected and so had no incentive 
to alter their behavior.   5 
meaning that we do not need to rely on notoriously unreliable student self-reports for 
outcome data. 
The university in question also provided us with information from admissions records 
(the student’s high school attended, grade point average, college entrance exam scores, 
race/ethnicity, and sex) as well as transcript data when in college (courses taken and 
grades earned).  These data allow us to identify the effects of attending a high school 
threatened with accountability sanctions on a student’s subsequent collegiate success.  
 We find that school accountability plans have the potential to substantially affect high-
achieving students’ study habits and performance in college.  First we observe that school 
accountability plans apparently alter student study habits in college.  Students who 
attended schools threatened with sanctions under either school accountability system 
displayed a dramatically increased likelihood of cramming once they attended the 
university in question.  Although we lack the ability to explore whether cramming 
behavior is directly responsible for the relationship between accountability sanction 
threats and student collegiate performance across a wide range of subjects, we can show 
that the more students in an online-viewed course crammed, the worse they performed in 
those classes.  Second, we find that when looking at a range of college courses, school 
accountability plans effect student course performance at the university in question – but 
not in uniform ways.  While accountability threats from the first accountability system 
appears to have reduced student performance in college in general, the new 
accountability system did not have the same broad negative effect on collegiate 
performance.  Instead, this introduction had a positive estimated effect on mathematics   6 
performance and other technical subjects and no large negative effects on other subjects.  
We suspect this is due to the fact that the new system introduced in 1999 was strongly 
standards-based, while the disbanded system was not.  Therefore, the evidence suggests 
that poor student study habits may be partially to blame for the low course performance 
of students affected by the first accountability system, and that the second accountability 
system, while apparently improving students’ performance in college courses, may have 
been more effective in improving student collegiate performance were it not for the poor 
study habits that accompanied the system’s introduction. 
Two accountability systems 
In 1999, the state in question dramatically changed its school accountability system.  
Prior to 1999, schools were graded according to aggregate student performance on a low-
level test of basic skills, that is, a minimum standard of proficiency that was not linked to 
instructional or curricular standards.  Beginning in 1999, the state changed its system of 
evaluating schools to be based on meeting proficiency targets on a new standards-based 
test.  The new test discriminated performance at a much higher level, and was aligned to 
a far greater extent to the subject matter that state educators expected students to master.  
While the majority of students statewide scored in the highest category of the test used 
for pre-1999 accountability, only a small fraction of students scored in the highest 
category of the test used for post-1999 accountability.  The result is that the newer 
accountability system was likely to affect directly the measured learning of all students, 
including four-year college-bound students, in a high school, while the older 
accountability system was less likely to affect directly the high-performing students’ 
measured academic skills.  Put differently, because high achieving students were more or   7 
less automatically going to do well on the low-level test they faced, schools had more of 
an incentive under the older accountability regime to substitute attention away from 
college-bound students than they did under the new accountability regime.  And since 
college-bound students’ performance mattered more in the new accountability regime, 
there was a larger incentive for schools to build the human capital of these students under 
the new regime. 
But while the two accountability systems differed considerably in their potential direct 
effects on measured academic performance in high school, both accountability systems 
had the potential to influence student study skills and the ways in which students 
approach learning.  Students in schools facing accountability pressure might learn from 
their school that test performance is the goal in itself, and so might change their approach 
to education from deliberate study for the sake of learning to concentrated study, that is, 
cramming, for the sake of test performance.
4  Both accountability regimes could 
potentially help to instill this new study ethic in high-performing students.  It is not clear 
which accountability system would do this the most.  In the earlier accountability system, 
schools had a greater incentive to generally ignore high-achieving students and prepare 
these students for the tests, if at all, in a very concentrated period of time which could 
well lead these students to learn to cram as a result.  On the other hand, in the later 
accountability system, the stakes for schools were higher and the concentration on test 
results as a major outcome of interest increased.  The increased importance of the test 
                                                 
4  Anecdotal evidence abounds regarding these changing attitudes.  Schools threatened with accountability 
sanctions often offer parties to reward students for high aggregate test performance, hold pep rallies to gear 
students up for the accountability test, and teach test-specific preparation skills to students and their 
parents.   8 
results could induce schools to prepare the students more intensively as the test drew 
closer and less intensively when the test was either farther away or over, thereby teaching 
students to cram.. 
Most important for the purposes of this study is that the changing accountability regimes 
dramatically affected which schools were threatened with accountability sanctions.  Some 
schools immediately transitioned from being threatened to no longer being threatened, 
while other schools were affected in the reverse.  Table 1 presents evidence of the 
transitions between accountability systems.  Specifically, because we will be employing 
high school fixed effects in our regression models, we describe the transitions only of 
high schools for which students in both the high school class of 2000 and the high school 
class of 2001 are represented in our data.  We observe that 22 percent of schools changed 
accountability status from one accountability regime to the other, with the majority of 
these schools becoming less threatened once the accountability regime shifted.  Nine 
percent of schools were threatened with sanctions in both accountability regimes, while 
69 percent of schools were threatened in neither accountability regime.  Our analysis will 
focus on the bottom-left and top-right cells of Table 1 – the schools that transitioned from 
threatened to not threatened, and vice versa. 
Table 2 describes the attributes of the high-achieving students in our study, based on the 
accountability status of their high school.  We observe that the schools that transitioned 
from unthreatened to threatened and vice versa were somewhat different from one 
another, and also different from the schools whose accountability status did not change 
over this time period.  Specifically, the high schools that were not threatened under the   9 
old accountability regime but became threatened under the new accountability regime 
sent students to the university in question who were more likely to be male, black and 
Hispanic and who had modestly lower college entrance exam scores and slightly lower 
adjusted high school grade point averages than did the high schools whose accountability 
status changed from threatened to unthreatened or whose accountability status did not 
change.  The fact that these differences in student characteristics across schools are 
apparent underscores the importance of estimating high school fixed effects models, 
where we compare students from one graduating class in a given high school to students 
in the next graduating class from the same high school. 
Table 2 also compares one student attribute – SAT scores – within the same schools 
across graduating classes.  As can be seen, SAT scores improved for enrollees from the 
high school class of 2001 vis-à-vis enrollees from the high school class of 2000 for all 
types of schools.  However, we observe that the group of schools that experienced a 
transition from unthreatened to threatened as the accountability regime changed saw the 
greatest improvement in students sent to the university, at least according to this metric.  
This finding underscores the necessity of controlling for student background 
characteristics in the school fixed effects analyses that follow. 
Measuring study skills in college 
The first purpose of this paper is to measure the effects of school accountability sanction 
threats on the development of study skills.  While it is impossible to directly measure 
study skills, we can measure an indicator of these skills.  The university that provided us 
with the data had six classes for which the professors delivered lectures and the students   10 
watched the lectures on-line.  All of these classes are required for at least one major and 
several of them are required for many different majors across the university.  The 
students in these majors must take these on-line classes.  For these six on-line classes, for 
the Spring 2003 semester the university recorded not only the date of download for each 
online-viewed class, but also the specific lecture downloaded.  We can therefore identify 
the degree to which students delay watching lectures, which is one measure of cramming 
for the exam and one potentially important study skill.   
Our data consist of observations on 2064 students who attended 249 public high schools 
in the state for which students in both the high school graduating classes of 2000 and 
2001 are present in the data.  Using these data, we first study the extent of cramming, its 
persistence across courses, and its effect on students’ grades.  Then we explore whether 
accountability sanctions can lead to cramming behavior. 
Figure 1 illustrates definitively that cramming for exams occurs and is widespread in the 
online-viewed classes.  Each of the six graphs presents time-series plots of the fraction of 
first-time downloads of lectures per day, per course.  It is immediately apparent that the 
pattern of downloads exhibits large cycles, and the dates of the exams in each course are 
obvious by inspection.  Table 3 presents similar data in tabular form.  The second column 
shows that 16 percent of the lectures were first downloaded by students on the day they 
were delivered and another 20 percent of the lectures were first downloaded over the next 
two days.  But one-quarter of lectures delivered more than one week before the exam 
were first downloaded in the week prior to the exam and the same fraction is true for 
those lectures delivered more than two weeks before the exam.  Looking more strictly at   11 
last minute cramming, three percent of the lectures were downloaded for the first time on 
the day of the test, and another nine percent of the lectures were downloaded for the first 
time one or two days before the test (this is not counting lectures delivered close to the 
time of the test in question.)  For empirical purposes, we define cramming as the fraction 
of lectures delivered seven or more days before an exam that were first downloaded 
within two days of an exam.  Table 3 shows that by this definition, over 13 percent of 
lectures were crammed. 
The argument that accountability sanction threats teach cramming behavior requires that, 
for some students, cramming is a “trait” – an attribute of the student that persists and not 
simply the random occurrence within a specific class.  Tables 4 and 5 present some 
evidence that this is the case.  We observe (see Table 4) that some students consistently 
kept up with lectures while others consistently procrastinated.  The second column shows 
that 31 percent of students were never observed downloading a lecture within two days of 
the lecture delivery and only 2.5 percent of students downloaded every lecture within two 
days of delivery. 57 percent of students downloaded fewer than one-fifth of the lectures 
within two days of delivery.  While few students waited until the last moment to 
download every lecture, a non-trivial fraction of students delayed downloads of many 
lectures.  Column three shows that over 2 percent of students first viewed more than half 
of their lectures for the first time (!) within two days of an exam and over 10 percent first 
downloaded at least one-fifth of their lectures within two days of an exam.  The presence   12 
of these patterns suggests that students tend either to keep up with the course or to delay 
viewing the lectures.
 5 
Table 5 illustrates that students who tend to cram in one class tend to cram in all of their 
classes.  This table presents a cross-tabulation of students’ cramming behavior in two 
courses taken simultaneously, for the set of students for whom behavior in two courses is 
observed.  The top panel investigates the percentage of lectures downloaded within two 
days of delivery.  We observe that if a student in course #1 downloaded less than one-
third of lectures within two days of delivery, he or she was very likely to do the same (69 
percent) in his or her other class, and only had a 15 percent chance of downloading more 
than two-thirds of the lectures in the other class within two days of delivery.  On the other 
hand, if the student in course #1 downloaded more than two-thirds of lectures within two 
days of delivery, he or she had a 43 percent chance of downloading less than one-third of 
lectures in his or her other class within two days, but had a 41 percent chance of 
downloading two-thirds or more of lectures in his or her other class within two days of 
delivery.  The bottom panel presents similar evidence for downloading classes within two 
days of an exam.  In this panel, if a student downloaded 0 percent of the lectures for the 
first time within 2 days of an exam for the first class, there was an 82 percent chance that 
the student also downloaded 0 percent of lectures in the second course within 2 days of 
an exam and only a 5 percent chance of downloading more than one-fifth of the lectures 
within 2 days of an exam. The lesson from these tables is that while cramming in courses 
                                                 
5 Table 4 shows the persistence of cramming for all students for all classes. There is also considerable 
within-student persistence within any given course.  Students who tend to cram for the first exam in a 
course also tend to cram for the second exam in the course.    13 
does not follow a one-to-one correspondence, there is a very high degree of within-
student persistence in cramming across classes. 
Table 6 shows that students who cram are somewhat more likely to be male, somewhat 
more likely to be Hispanic and Asian, and tend to have higher SAT scores than do 
students who don’t cram.  While high school grade point averages are slightly higher for 
cramming students as for those who do not cram, the differences are not great. 
Given that cramming tends to persist for individual students, the next logical question is 
whether cramming has a deleterious effect on student outcomes in the class in which 
cramming occurs.  Table 7 presents separate regressions of the relationship between 
cramming behavior (as measured by the fraction of classes delivered more than a week in 
advance of the test and first downloaded within two days of the exam) and a student’s 
grade in the class, for each of the six online classes.  We observe a consistent pattern 
between cramming and course performance: holding constant student attributes, students 
who cram more tend to perform at a lower level in the class.  This correlation is 
significant at conventional levels in five the six regressions.  Table 7 also presents 
separate regressions for students who attended threatened schools in either accountability 
regime, and those who attended schools that were not threatened in either accountability 
regime.  Though not all the coefficients attain conventional levels of statistical 
significance, the signs of all the estimated coefficients are negative so we again observe 
consistent evidence of a negative relationship between cramming behavior and student 
course grades, regardless of the nature of the high school that the student attended, and 
across courses.  In sum, student cramming persists across time within a course, and   14 
across courses, and is associated with reduced student course performance.  Recall that if 
anything, cramming students tend to look better on observables (in terms of SAT scores 
and perhaps in terms of high school grade point average) than do students who cram less.  
So it is important to explore whether accountability sanction threats lead high schools to 
“teach” their high-performing, college-bound students to cram.  We turn to this 
possibility next. 
Do accountability sanction threats induce student cramming? 
Table 8 presents estimates of the relationship between accountability sanction threats and 
student cramming behavior.  Two measures of cramming are presented – the fraction of 
total lectures first downloaded within one week of the exam and the fraction of total 
lectures delivered a week or more before the exam and first downloaded within two days 
of the exam.  We estimate the model: 
(Fraction of lectures downloaded)isc = ￿s + ac + gXisc + b(Accountability threat)sc + misc , 
where X is a vector of student background characteristics (race/ethnicity, sex, high school 
adjusted grade point average, and SAT scores), s represents the high school attended and 
c represents the student’s graduating class.  Because outcomes might differ depending on 
which accountability regime is active at the relevant time for a given student i, we 
estimate two b coefficients – one for the estimated effect of the old accountability 
sanctions and one for the estimated effect of the new accountability sanctions.  If the   15 
accountability system induces increased cramming behavior, the estimated b coefficients 
on the presence of threatened sanctions will be positive.
6 
The results in Table 8 show that cramming behavior is associated with accountability 
sanction threats.  When such a threat is removed, students attending a formerly-
sanctioned school subsequently cram less in college than do their predecessors who 
attended the high school when the school was threatened.  Conversely, when a new threat 
is introduced, students attending a newly-sanctioned school subsequently cram more in 
college than did their predecessors who attended the high school before it was threatened.  
The estimated effects of the new accountability system are greater in magnitude and 
statistical significance than are the estimated effects of the older accountability system. 
This finding is consistent with the suggestion that the the new accountability system, with 
its increased emphasis on all students’ test scores, may teach higher-achieving students to 
cram more than did the older accountability system, under which the higher-performing 
students could basically have been neglected. 
To help insure the robustness of our results, we conducted two falsification exercises.  
The first such exercise, reported in the second column of Table 9, utilizes data from the 
graduation classes of 1999 and 2000, rather than 2000 and 2001, and assumes that the 
accountability system switch occurred a year before it actually did.
7  We observe that 
there is no apparent relationship between cramming and changes in accountability 
regimes when the accountability regime did not actually change. 
                                                 
6 A full set of coefficient estimates is presented in Appendix Table 1. 
7 The number of observations differs from the first and third column because the number of relevant 
schools and students is different in this exercise.  The results of the falsification exercise are virtually 
unchanged were we to limit the sample of schools to be the same as in the first and third columns.   16 
Our second falsification exercise involves using the same data as in the actual analysis, 
but applying the 1998 standards to test scores realized in 1999 and 1999 standards to test 
scores realized in 1998, for the purposes of calculating which schools would have been 
sanctioned if the systems, but not the test scores used to determine a school’s 
accountability grades, had been swapped.  Again, we find no apparent relationship 
between measured cramming and this other characterization of school test scores. These 
results suggest that it is the potential sanctions from the accountability system, and not 
the actual school performance underlying the accountability system, that apparently led to 
teaching cramming behavior to an affected school’s students.  Our results also indicate 
that schools apparently responded rapidly to the change in accountability regimes.  The 
first year after a school is newly threatened with sanctions or newly relieved of potential 
sanctions, the empirical results demonstrate an immediate change in their college-bound 
students’ study habits.  
Effects of accountability on collegiate grades 
Given that school accountability systems of both types apparently induced a persistent 
change in study behavior among college-bound students, it is interesting to determine the 
degree to which school accountability has affected these students’ performances in 
college.  The same forces that led to changes in outcomes could have made students more 
effective or less effective class-takers because, in addition to teaching college-bound 
students to cram, school accountability pressures may have either improved or harmed 
these students’ human capital directly by increasing or decreasing their knowledge in 
particular fields.  Given the differences in the accountability systems, we expect that the 
threat of sanctions with old system, under which high-performing students could be   17 
neglected, would have more adverse net consequences for high-performing students than 
similar threats under the new system, which is based on meeting higher-level proficiency 
targets linked to the curriculum.  To examine this issue, we focus on the introductory 
classes taken at the university.  These courses, with the first digit being a “1” or a “2”, are 
typically taken by freshmen and sophomores at the university.  This set of courses is 
much more inclusive than the six courses considered in the cramming portion of this 
paper.  The university in question provided us with a broader data set that we can use for 
this analysis.  Between Fall 2002 and Fall 2004, for every student who ever took one of 
the six Internet courses we focused upon above, the university provided us with transcript 
data giving us the grades in all their courses and admission data.
8  These students account 
for over three-quarters of the students at the university, so selection into the sample does 
not seem to be at issue.  We focus on the all the introductory courses taken by these 
students, regardless of when they took the course.  Our approach is to estimate variants of 
the following model: 
(Grade)isc = ￿s + ac + gXisc + b (Accountability threat)sc + misc , 
where all notation is as before and “Grade” is the student’s grade in the ith introductory 
course.  In addition, we include course-specific fixed effects to account for the fact that 
student grades differ dramatically from one class to another at the university. 
Table 9 presents evidence of the relationship between student grades and accountability 
sanction threats for students in introductory courses at the university in question.  Each 
row represents a different set of courses, and the two estimated b coefficients for each 
                                                 
8  Unfortunately we had the download data we used for the analysis above for only the one semester.   18 
regression are reported in the table.
9  The first column of the table shows the estimated 
effects of the old accountability sanction threats, while the second column shows the 
estimated effects of the new accountability system.  The outcome is a student’s course 
grade (on a four-point scale, with a grade of “A” being 4 points). 
The first row of Table 9 illustrates the estimated effects of school accountability regimes 
on student grades across all introductory subjects at the university.  The results are starkly 
different from the cramming results earlier: While the old school accountability system, 
based on low-level tests of basic skills, appears to have a negative impact on the 
collegiate performance of college-bound students who attended potentially-sanctioned 
high schools, the new accountability system improved the performance of these students.  
Apparently the beneficial effects of the new system’s increased emphasis on higher level 
skills overcame its tendency to teach students to cram so that the net effect on students’ 
grades in introductory courses was positive.  Moreover, the estimated effects are 
relatively large in addition to being statistically significant:  Given that the mean college 
grade is a “B”, an increase or decrease of 0.1 grade points is a large change. 
Both accountability systems placed emphasis on student performance in mathematics, 
reading, and writing.  While it is difficult to measure courses in reading comprehension in 
college, we can directly test for estimated effects of school accountability systems on 
mathematics and English composition.  The second and third rows present the estimated 
effects of accountability on math classes (e.g., calculus, college algebra, introductory 
                                                 
9 The coefficient estimates on race/ethnicity, sex, graduation class, SAT scores, and high school grade point 
average are available upon request from the authors.   19 
statistics, quantitative methods) and English composition classes.  We observe that the 
estimated effects of the old accountability system are negative for these classes as well, 
but the estimated effects of the new accountability system are particularly strong and 
positive for the mathematics classes.  If schools were responding to higher standards 
embedded in the new accountability system, it follows that mathematics training may be 
improved, an effect manifested in higher performance once at the university.  On the 
other hand, there is no apparent positive effect of the new accountability system in 
English composition classes.  This might be due to the possibility that the new 
accountability standards for writing focused on formulaic writing skills that reflect clarity 
of expression and exposition, but not higher-order writing skills. 
The fourth row of Table 9 considers the relatively quantitative non-mathematics courses 
at the university in question.  We define “relatively quantitative” as the courses where the 
average mathematics SAT scores of students taking the class exceeded the university 
average; these courses include introductory chemistry, physics, economics, and other 
similar classes.  We find evidence of positive effects of the new accountability system – 
though half the size of the estimated effects on mathematics courses – as well as negative 
estimated effects of the older accountability system.  This implies that the higher 
mathematics standards in the new accountability system appear to have positive 
spillovers to the other quantitative courses at the university. 
Finally, the fifth row of Table 9 presents estimated effects of the two accountability 
standards on the relatively un-quantitative courses at the university.  We continue to find 
negative, significant estimated effects of the old accountability system.  However, the   20 
estimated effect of the new accountability system on the less quantitative system is 
statistically and economically around zero.  This result indicates that the potential 
positive benefit of the new accountability system is concentrated in the more 
mathematical courses, suggesting a positive spillover from increased pressure of schools 
to perform, especially in mathematics. 
While we believe that an accountability system based on poorly-defined standards and 
low-level skills, such as the system in place before 1999, leads to reduced student 
performance in college, an alternative explanation for the findings that the old 
accountability system had a generally negative consequence is that the schools that were 
threatened with sanctions have been improving over time – either due to the 
accountability system or for other reasons.  There are at least three reasons to believe that 
this is not the case.  First, we note that we are comparing two adjacent cohorts of students 
from the same school.  Because these students came from the same schools, it is unlikely 
that there were massive changes in student composition from one year to the next.  In 
addition, these students shared three of the four years of high school together.  It 
therefore seems more likely that the findings presented herein are due to shocks to a 
school from one year to the next, rather than temporal trends.  More compelling is the 
finding that schools which were threatened with sanctions under the former regime but no 
longer threatened with sanctions under the new regime did not improve their aggregate 
test scores (as reported by the state’s department of education) from one year to the next. 
This fact indicates that it was the regime change, rather than improvements due to 
incentives put in place under the old accountability regime, that led to the changes in 
observed behavior by students once they came to the university.  Finally, we conducted   21 
falsification exercises in which we feed each cohort’s aggregate test scores through the 
other cohort’s accountability regime; we find no evidence that changes in student 
attributes or test scores are responsible for the patterns described herein.  Rather, the 
patterns appear due to the design of the accountability regimes themselves. 
Conclusion 
This paper presents the first evidence of the effects of school accountability systems on 
the long-term human capital development of high-performing, college-bound students.  
The results are mixed.  On the one hand, the evidence is consistent that school 
accountability sanction threats are associated with changes in student study habits.  
Students who attended high schools that were threatened with accountability sanctions 
systematically study differently than did their school-mates who graduated from high 
school in an adjacent year but who were not directly affected by the school’s threat of 
sanctions.  Students from high schools threatened with sanctions postpone studying and 
cram more than students from the same high schools when the schools were not 
threatened with sanctions.  The tendency toward increased cramming seems likely to 
result when threatened schools place a heavy emphasis on the outcomes of a specific test, 
rather than on overall learning outcomes over the entire year.  We also find evidence that 
the induced increase in student cramming, ceteris paribus, leads to reduced course 
performance in the classes in which the student crams. 
On the other hand, whether school accountability sanction threats lead to lower overall 
student course performance than would have occurred in the absence of such threats is 
not as clear.  We observe that students attending high schools that were threatened with   22 
sanctions under the state’s old accountability regime tended to perform at a lower level in 
their coursework at the university, all else equal.  But we do not observe this same pattern 
with regard to the new accountability regime.  In fact, students attending high schools 
threatened with the new sanctions performed at a higher level in mathematics and 
quantitative courses than their school-mates had previously done, all else equal, but the 
differential performance is not observed in less quantitative courses.  We suspect that the 
difference in outcomes across these accountability regimes – and across course subjects 
in the new accountability regime – is due to the standards-based nature of the new 
accountability regime and to the subjects emphasized in the new accountability system. 
These results provide potential lessons for the design of accountability systems.  The 
finding that students are apparently better prepared for college coursework in the specific 
subjects that are emphasized by the accountability system suggests that accountability 
systems that cover more subject areas may in turn produce better-prepared students.  At 
the same time, the finding that students performed better when their schools were 
threatened with sanctions under a standards-based accountability system than under an 
accountability system with lower standards indicates that a system with high-quality tests 
closely aligned with rigorous standards is likely to yield better student preparation for 
higher education.  Indeed, one result that seems unambiguous is that an accountability 
system based on poorly-defined standards and low-level skills unambiguously harms 
college-bound students from high schools that are threatened with sanctions.  Students 
from these high schools not only cram but also do significantly worse in their 
introductory college classes.   23 
To the extent to which school accountability systems encourages ignoring college-bound 
students, the systems may lead to the unintended consequence of adversely changing the 
ways in which high-performing students approach learning and scholarship.  Hence the 
design of the accountability system is perhaps more important that previously thought.  
Accountability systems, such as Florida’s system implemented in 2002, that reward and 
sanction schools based on gains in students’ scores rather than levels of students’ 
performance might present schools with less of an incentive to substitute effort away 
from higher-performing students toward lower-performing students.  But this suggestion 
must remain speculation at the present because determining the impact of this new 
accountability system will require additional research.   24 
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Figure 1: Time-series patterns of first time student downloads of lectures, six Internet 
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Table 1: Transitions from one accountability system to another, high school classes of 
2000 and 2001: 
 
High school threatened with sanctions in 
high-stakes test year, class of 2001 
 







0.021  High school 
threatened with 
sanctions in high-
stakes test year, 
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Table 2: Attributes of students in study, by high school transition, high school classes of 
2000 and 2001 
In-state public school graduates only 
 









High school did not 
change status 
Male  0.56  0.48  0.49 
Black   0.13  0.08  0.06 
Hispanic  0.21  0.08  0.09 
Asian  0.12  0.13  0.08 
SAT score  1196  1218  1239 
Adjusted high 
school GPA 
3.8  3.9  3.9 
Comparing attributes of students in each of the two high school graduation cohorts 
SAT scores: high 
school class of 2000 
1174  1208  1233 
SAT scores: high 
school class of 2001 
1208  1228  1245 
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Timing of download 
 
Fraction of first 
downloads 
Fraction of first 
downloads, lecture 
delivered >=7 days 
before test 
Fraction of first 
downloads, lecture 
delivered >=14 days 
before test 
Day of lecture  0.159  0.140  0.137 
1-2 days later  0.203  0.177  0.167 
3-6 days later  0.253  0.235  0.199 
>=7 days later,  
>=7 days before test  
0.168  0.196  0.271 
>=7 days later, 
3-6 days before test 
0.099  0.116  0.123 
>=7 days later,  
1-2 days before test 
0.086  0.100  0.084 
>=7 days later, 
Day of test 
0.032  0.037  0.019 
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Table 4: Cramming as a trait:  






Fraction of students: 
Percentage of lectures 
downloaded within 2 days 
of delivery 
Fraction of students: Percentage 
of lectures downloaded 2 or 
fewer days before the exam (for 
lectures delivered >=7 days 
before exam) 
Never  0.311  0.533 
0.1-9.9%  0.132  0.263 
10-19.9%  0.131  0.102 
20-29.9%  0.098  0.045 
30-39.9%  0.067  0.021 
40-49.9%  0.052  0.015 
50-59.9%  0.051  0.010 
60-69.9%  0.043  0.006 
70-79.9%  0.037  0.002 
80-89.9%  0.036  0.002 
90-99.9%  0.017  0.001 
Always  0.025  0.001 
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Table 5: Cramming as a trait: 
Persistence of cramming behavior across classes, by student (row percentages) 
 
Panel 1: Lectures downloaded 2 or fewer days after delivery (mean: 25.1%) 
Percentage of lectures downloaded 2 or fewer days 
after delivery, class #2 
 
0-33.3%  33.4-66.6%  66.7-100% 
0-33.3%  0.691  0.159  0.151 
33.4-66.6%  0.565  0.272  0.164 
Percentage of 
lectures 
downloaded 2 or 
fewer days after 
delivery, class #1 
66.7-100%  0.428  0.162  0.410 
 
Panel 2: Lectures downloaded 2 or fewer days prior to exam, for lectures delivered >=7 
days before exam (mean: 6.5%) 
Percentage of lectures downloaded 2 or fewer days 
prior to exam, class #2 
 
0%  0.1-20%  >20% 
0%  0.819  0.128  0.054 
0.1-20%  0.622  0.300  0.078 
Percentage of 
lectures 
downloaded 2 or 
fewer days prior 
to exam, class #1 
>20%  0.516  0.258  0.226 
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Table 6: Attributes of students with different levels of cramming behavior 
 
  Percentage of lectures downloaded 2 or fewer days before exam 
     0-33.3%  33.4-66.6%   66.7-100% 
Male  0.54  0.55  0.62 
Black   0.06  0.09  0.08 
Hispanic  0.11  0.12  0.14 
Asian  0.08  0.08  0.11 
SAT score  1189  1210  1227 
Adjusted high 
school GPA 
3.84  3.83  3.89 
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Table 7: Cramming and student course performance 
Student-level relationship between course grade and cramming behavior 
 
  Coefficient on fraction of classes first downloaded 2 or fewer days 
before exam 








attended schools not 
threatened in either 
accountability 
regime 





































Note: Each cell represents a separate regression.  Regressions also control for student sex, 
race/ethnicity, SAT scores, and high school grade point average.  Coefficients marked * 
(**) are statistically significant at the ten (five) percent level.   
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Table 8: Estimated effects of changing accountability regimes on student cramming 
behavior:  
High school fixed effects regressions; clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variable: fraction of total classes first downloaded within week (two days) of 
exam 
In-state public school graduates only 
 







Falsification test 1: 
Assume that 
accountability 
switch occurred one 





standards to 1999 
scores, and 1999 
standards to 1998 
scores (graduation 
years 2000, 2001) 
Number of students  2064  2394  2064 
Number of schools 
present in both years 
249  265  249 
Cramming measure: Fraction of total lectures downloaded within the week before the 
exam 


















Cramming measure: Fraction of total lectures downloaded 2 or fewer days before exam 



















Note: Coefficients marked * (**) are statistically significant at the ten (five) percent 
level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Regressions also include school fixed 
effects, course fixed effects, time effects, student race/ethnicity variables, student sex, 
student high school grade point average, and student SAT scores.     34 
Table 9: Estimated effects of changing accountability regimes on student course 
outcomes:  
High school fixed effects regressions; clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variable: grade in introductory course 
 
Introductory course  Estimated effect of old 
accountability sanction 
threat 
Estimated effect of new 
accountability sanction 
threat  























Note: Coefficients marked * (**) are statistically significant at the ten (five) percent 
level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Regressions also include school fixed 
effects, time effects, student race/ethnicity variables, student sex, student high school 
grade point average, and student SAT scores, as well as course fixed effects.   
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Appendix Table 1: Full set of coefficient estimates (except for course fixed effects and 
high school fixed effects): Table 8, specification 1, top panel 
 
Variable  Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Old accountability sanctions ´ post-change  0.030* 
(0.017) 
New accountability sanctions ´ pre-change  0.078** 
(0.035) 
Post-change  -0.007 
(0.014) 
Male  0.016 
(0.012) 
Black  0.002 
(0.041) 
White  -0.004 
(0.033) 
Asian  0.050 
(0.037) 
Hispanic  0.027 
(0.038) 
Have SAT score  -0.093 
(0.070) 
SAT score  0.00006 
(0.00006) 
Have high school GPA  -0.075 
(0.065) 
Adjusted high school GPA  0.021 
(0.017) 
 
Note: Coefficients marked * (**) are statistically significant at the ten (five) percent 
level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
 